University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2017

Inclusive Communities and Robust Causality: The
Constant Struggle to Balance Access to the Courts
with Protection for Defendants
Claire Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Williams, Claire, "Inclusive Communities and Robust Causality: The Constant Struggle to Balance Access to the Courts with
Protection for Defendants" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 98.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/98

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Inclusive Communities and Robust Causality: The
Constant Struggle to Balance Access to the
Courts with Protection for Defendants
Claire Williams∗
Imagine living in a rental house where raw sewage has been
piling up,1 where there is no adequate heating and cooling,
where there are no life-saving carbon monoxide or smoke detectors and the locks do not work. 2 Instead of making the fixes necessary to ensure that the house achieves a minimum level of habitability, the landlord sues the city for even having housing codes
that require such repairs, claiming that those repairs create a
disparate impact by reducing affordable housing. 3 Such resistance puts cities in a tenuous situation.4 On the one hand, if
∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2013,
Grinnell College. I would like to thank Professor Kristin Hickman for her support and guidance during this process. Thank you also to the staff and editors—
especially Hannah Nelson, Franklin Guenthner, and Joe Janochowski—of Minnesota Law Review for all of their assistance in developing and fine-tuning my
Note. Finally, I want to thank my parents, Deb Aronson and Ben Williams, for
supporting me throughout my law school career and especially during the
months that I worked on this Note. Copyright © 2017 by Claire Williams.
1. Jessica Masulli Reyes, Suit: Raw Sewage, Overcrowding Mar Congressional Candidate’s Rentals, NEWS J. (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www
.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/10/26/suit-raw-sewage
-overcrowding-mar-congressional-candidates-rentals/92764926.
2. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
neglected state in which landlords left rental houses); Tristan Hallman, Dallas
Makes Rules Tougher on Landlords with New Housing Standards, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-city-hall/
2016/09/28/dallas-gets-tough-landlords-improves-standards-renters
(chronicling landlord resistance to a city ordinance that required sufficient cooling capabilities).
3. See, e.g., Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14cv-3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016).
4. In Minneapolis, the city is seeking to revoke the rental license of a landlord who has routinely been cited for housing violations and admits that he lacks
the resources to maintain the properties. Randy Furst, Whistleblower: Minneapolis Out To Evict Landlord, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.startribune
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cities aggressively enforce housing codes, they could end up enabling mass evictions that displace entire communities.5 On the
other hand, if they do not enforce the codes, then landlords could
continue to rent unsafe and unsanitary properties. 6
This hypothetical has real consequences when landlords
bring the conflict between housing codes and safety into the
courts. Landlords sue cities under the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
alleging disparate impact due to the enforcement of housing
codes. 7 Frustrated by these suits, the Supreme Court recently
sought to give cities more protection by establishing a robust
causality requirement for plaintiffs alleging disparate impact. 8
The new standard emphasized the requirement that plaintiffs
identify a specific policy, not a one-time decision, that creates a
disparate impact. 9 The new standard was an attempt to allow
local officials to exercise their discretion as they craft housing
policy. 10
Even though robust causality could allow city officials more
leeway when performing their jobs, it should be abandoned because it only functions as a redundant and unnecessary barrier
to housing discrimination claims. Robust causality is deeply
flawed because the Supreme Court failed to provide sufficient
guidance to lower courts about when to apply the standard. As
it stands now, the new robust causality standard is at odds with
Supreme Court precedent regarding pleading for discrimination

.com/whistleblower-minneapolis-out-to-evict-landlord/134951388. And in Dallas a rental company, rather than complying with minimum housing codes, decided to evict 305 tenants. Editorial, Dallas Must Find a Way To Protect Tenants, Preserve Affordable Housing, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2016/10/25/dallas-must-find
-way-protect-tenants-preserve-affordable-housing. As a result of suits like
these, cities are faced with the choice of either relaxing housing codes and allowing substandard housing to persist, or enforcing the codes and potentially
putting hundreds of people on the streets—a choice ironically brought to them
under the Fair Housing Act. See infra Part I.A.
5. See Dianne Solis, Judge Halts Mass Evictions in West Dallas Pending
a Hearing on Merits of Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www
.dallasnews.com/news/social-justice-1/2016/10/11/judge-halts-mass-evictions
-west-dallas-pending-hearing-merits-case.
6. See, e.g., Hallman supra note 2; Reyes supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; Ellis, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1.
8. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
9. Id.
10. See id. at 2524 (discussing how this decision by the Court protected legitimate government interests).
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claims. 11 Robust causality also reflects a desire to give deference
to institutions and actors that still perpetuate a system of discrimination, and does not recognize how modern forms of discrimination operate.12
This Note argues that the robust causality requirement has
no place in disparate impact litigation. Such a standard ignores
the long history of government-sanctioned housing discrimination and could further restrict access to courts for discrimination
claims. The Supreme Court should abandon the robust causality
standard and return to traditional disparate impact analysis
and pleading requirements, which have sufficient protections for
defendants. Part I of this Note discusses the history of the FHA,
the history of the pleading standards in federal court, and the
role disparate impact litigation has played, without the robust
causality standard. Part II describes the robust causality decision, and illustrates the challenges and inconsistencies that robust causality creates. Part III argues that the Supreme Court
should abandon the new standard because it restricts access to
courts, and does not align with the FHA’s substantive goal of fair
and safe housing. This Note ultimately concludes that the robust
causality decision should be discarded because it creates confusion as to what is required of plaintiffs and is an unnecessary
and redundant standard.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc. operates against a background of the rich history of housing
and the normative judgments about access to courts. This Part
establishes the three main areas of law that are implicated by
the new robust causality standard from Inclusive Communities.
Section A discusses the previous housing policies and efforts by
the federal government to address housing discrimination. Section B outlines the pleading standard for civil cases. Finally, Section C discusses disparate impact litigation.
11. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13, 515 (2002)
(holding that disparate impact plaintiffs do not need to plead a prima facie case
to survive a motion to dismiss).
12. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 745–49 (2005) (discussing the impact of subconscious biases on decision-making); Jennifer C. Johnson, Race-Based Housing
Importunities: The Disparate Impact of Realistic Group Conflict, 8 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 97, 120–25 (2007) (describing the various mechanisms used to isolate
communities of color in particular neighborhoods).
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A. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
This Section starts by chronicling how government and private parties enabled and incentivized housing discrimination.
Next, it discusses the FHA, an attempt by Congress to remove
barriers to adequate housing. Finally, it highlights the history of
housing codes and the challenges of enforcement.
1. Before the Fair Housing Act
The federal government has a long history of racially discriminatory housing policies that facilitated segregation. 13 In
particular, the government incentivized homeownership, but the
incentives have not been equally available to the entire population.14 For example, the Home Owners Loan Corporation
(HOLC), established in the mid-1930s to grant low-interest
loans, appraised homes based on a system of categorization that
devalued property in neighborhoods where predominantly black
families lived. 15 The Federal Housing Administration, which
was responsible for categorizing homes and neighborhoods for
loan eligibility with private companies, followed the example set
by HOLC. 16 It declared entire neighborhoods in city centers or
in industrial areas ineligible for loans, which led to exodus and
continued decline of property value. 17 These discriminatory
credit programs made it almost impossible for black homeowners
to purchase homes. 18 As a result, by 1960, 27.4% of the people
13. Since Reconstruction “the Federal Government itself was responsible
for promoting racial discrimination in housing and residential segregation.”
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due 1999: Addendum: United States of America, para. 214, U.N.
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000).
14. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 190–91, 196–215 (1985) (discussing federal programs
that benefitted homeowners and the ways in which communities of color were
unable to take advantage of those programs).
15. Id. at 197–98. “[E]ven those neighborhoods with small proportions of
black inhabitants were usually rated Fourth grade or ‘hazardous.’” Id. at 201.
16. Id. 213–15.
17. Id. at 213–14. The Federal Housing Administration has closely guarded
its data, but one commentator, Charles Abrams, declared that the “FHA
adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the Nuremberg
laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all white neighborhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities
from buying houses in white neighborhoods.” Id. at 214.
18. Cf. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 115–40
(2005) (describing how even programs like the G.I. Bill, which was meant to
benefit both black and white veterans equally, could not help black veterans
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living in city centers were black, compared to 5.4% in the outlying suburban areas. 19 These federal programs and policies both
codified racial segregation in government actions and enabled
private parties to further exacerbate already present segregation.
In addition to federal loan programs, local zoning regulations have also been used to exclude minority populations. 20
Some of those exclusions were explicit. For example, in Kentucky
in the early 1900s there was an ordinance making it “unlawful
for any colored person to move into and occupy as a residence . . .
any house upon any block upon which a greater number of
houses are occupied . . . by white people than are occupied . . . by
colored people.”21 But housing discrimination was not always so
direct. Exclusionary zoning ordinances focused on economics, instead of race, such that they appeared neutral in theory, and became discriminatory in application.22 Economically motivated
zoning ordinances dictated the size of lots, the width of buildings,
or the number of family units in a house.23 By reducing the density of housing or people, zoning regulations increased housing
costs in that area, thereby indirectly excluding people of lower
incomes.24 Rules that target building size appeared facially neutral but “[i]n actuality zoning was a device to keep poor people
overcome discriminatory obstacles to purchasing homes). These federal programs certainly did not create housing discrimination, but did perpetuate it at
an “unprecedented scale.” See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 199.
19. Loren Miller, Government’s Responsibility for Residential Segregation,
in RACE & PROPERTY 58, 58 (John H. Denton ed., 1964). Housing segregation is
not without consequences. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:
RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 5 (1996) (detailing the benefits enjoyed
by mostly-white suburbs). Minority neighborhoods are often plagued with inadequate schools and other substandard public services. Id.
20. See, e.g., Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1289,
1293 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (discussing how the Dallas Housing Authority had a “deliberate policy of strict racial segregation.”); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (describing Chicago Housing Authority’s quota
system that was designed to segregate black families).
21. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1917).
22. Janai S. Nelson, Residential Zoning Regulations and the Perpetuation
of Apartheid, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1699 (1996) (discussing how economic zoning laws have discriminatory impact because often socioeconomic status is correlated with race).
23. J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J.
761, 764 (1982).
24. Nelson, supra note 22, at 1699. In other contexts, lawmakers have utilized what appear to be neutral building code requirements to affect a targeted
and specific substantive impact. See, e.g., David Nather, Supreme Court Strikes
Down Texas Abortion Clinic Regulations, STAT (June 27, 2016), https://www
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. . . out of affluent areas.” 25 With wealth as a proxy for race, these
zoning regulations continued racially segregated housing patterns that had been established by explicit racial limits.
In addition to the exclusionary zoning regulations, local government decisions about the construction and allocation of affordable housing exacerbated the problem of discrimination and
segregation. Federal programs often relied upon “local initiative
and responsibility,” which meant local governments had a large
amount of discretion in deciding where to place public housing
units. 26 As a result, most suburbs did not have low-income housing. 27 Cities were then left to build affordable housing units in
city centers, which necessitated demolishing and displacing communities already located there at the time.28 In the end, the
housing policies and decisions created “[t]wo worlds . . . residentially segregated minority areas with poor-quality schools, inadequate public facilities . . . and a suburban sphere whose housing, infrastructure, densities and ways of life [were] more
expensive and expansive . . . .” 29 The combination of federal, local, and private decisions lent government authority to discriminatory housing patterns and exacerbated housing discrimination.
2. The Fair Housing Act Addressed the Barriers to Accessing
Housing
Recognizing the damaging effects of housing segregation,
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act.30 In 1968, President
Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the idea of fair housing legislation.31 The country was in the midst of the civil rights movement,
including the passage of other landmark statutes, riots in major
.statnews.com/2016/06/27/supreme-court-texas-abortion.
25. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 242.
26. Id. at 225.
27. Id. at 224–27.
28. Id.
29. HAAR, supra note 19, at 5.
30. Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2008).
31. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 17,
1968), https://www.millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/
january-17-1968-state-union-address (last visited Dec. 3, 2017) (“ The next essential is more housing—and more housing now. Surely a nation that can go to
the moon can place a decent home within the reach of its families . . . . I propose,
for the consideration of this Congress, a 10-year campaign to build 6 million new
housing units for low- and middle-income families.”).
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cities, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 32 Congress recognized that law (both federal and local) created “segregation [that] led to ‘black ghettos’ across the United States,
which resulted in a population of poor Blacks residing almost
exclusively in low-income neighborhoods.” 33 These laws, preferences, and motivations were a “relic of slavery,” 34 so Congress
made it a priority to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” 35 that had been, in part, the result of uncurbed
discretion of local zoning officials.36
The FHA targeted overt obstacles to access.37 The goal of the
FHA was “to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States.” 38 The FHA made it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer” to a person based upon “race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.” 39 It also prohibited discrimination “in

32. Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme Court’’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO.
L. REV. 539, 552–53 (2014).
33. S. Lamar Gardner, #BlackLivesMatter, Disparate-Impact, and the
Property Agenda, 43 S.U. L. REV. 321, 327 (2016). In 1966, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Attorney General Katzenbach said
that “it is highly relevant that government action—both State and Federal—
has contributed so much to existing patterns of housing segregation.” Civil
Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 87 (1966). A statement that was confirmed by Roy
Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP. Id. at 551. The same conversation
happened in the Senate a year later, with Attorney General Ramsey Clark and
the Department of Justice reiterating the enormous role the Federal Housing
Authority and Veterans Administration had played in furthering segregation.
Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban
Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. (1967).
34. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968).
35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
36. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).
37. Scholars fiercely debate whether the FHA was effective. Compare Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and Beyond,
11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 37 (2001) (“It may even be opined that the Fair Housing Act presents a smoke screen behind which lawmakers can hide, pretending
the consequences of our racism are being dealt with, while in truth the separation of races remains unchallenged.”), with CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES,
WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR?: RACE, CLASS, AND RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES
39 (2006) (“In addition to ending legal housing market discrimination, the Fair
Housing Act marked the end of public discussion of residential segregation. . . .”).
38. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
39. Id. § 3604(a).
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the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” 40 in the advertisement of the property, 41 and in the representation as to “when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 42
Congress attempted to provide a statutory avenue to counter the
legal and cultural history of preventing people of color from even
entering the housing market. 43 The FHA acknowledged and addressed the discriminatory practices that had shaped the housing market. However, once a person had housing there was still
the potential for discrimination in upkeep and maintenance of
the space. Housing codes were next in the line of legal obligations
to protect people from discriminatory housing practices.
3. Enforcement and Impact of Housing Codes
Housing codes are part of the fair-housing ideal enacted to
ensure that all residents live in safe housing, regardless of socioeconomic status. However, landlords sometimes challenge
these codes because they increase operating costs. Also, housing
codes often function like older zoning regulations, appearing facially neutral but in actuality targeting specific communities.
a. Safety Housing Codes
Housing codes were designed to ensure that all residents
could live in safe buildings. In 1967, President Johnson created
the Douglass Commission to study housing codes and develop
standards in an effort to “insure decent and durable housing.” 44
The Commission recognized that racial segregation had led to
substandard housing and fueled resentment in urban communities.45 Today housing “code enforcement remains the principal
method by which cities can ensure that minimum housing conditions are maintained.” 46 They include provisions pertaining to
“basic equipment and facilities for light, ventilation, heating and
sanitation; for safety from fire; for crime prevention; for space,
40. Id. § 3604(b).
41. Id. § 3604(c).
42. Id. § 3604(d).
43. There are several subsections that pertain to substantive rights, such
as prohibiting discrimination in rights and services following purchase. See Oliveri, supra note 30, at 3–10 (detailing various provisions within the FHA and
the ways in which they are meant to combat discriminatory practices).
44. Susan L. Ruby, The Great Society and Housing in America: Then and
Now, 40 REAL EST. REV. J., Fall 2011, at 41, 41.
45. Id. at 42–43.
46. Richard E. Carlton, Richard Landfield & James B. Loken, Enforcement
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 803 (1965).
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use and location; and for safe and sanitary maintenance of all
structures and premises.” 47 Because it costs money to maintain
a habitable housing unit, cities use blanket, rather than individual, enforcement to “eliminat[e] much of the competitive advantage of buildings with lower operating costs due to undetected violations” with the hope of encouraging landlords to
maintain minimum safety and habitability standards.48
St. Paul, Minnesota, for example, had a series of housing
codes meant to ensure safe housing and promote public health
and safety. The Property Maintenance Code “[e]stablishe[d]
minimum maintenance standards for all structures and premises” relating to safety, sanitation, and crime prevention.49 St.
Paul also had a Department of Neighborhood Housing and Property Improvement (DNHPI), which was “responsible for administering and enforcing the Housing Code.”50 The goal of the
DNHPI was to “compel property owners to take greater responsibility for their properties or, alternatively, force changes in
ownership.” 51 In addition, St. Paul enforced the housing codes
through a code compliance certification procedure, which required an inspection for properties that had been remodeled or
had been “deemed a dangerous structure, a nuisance building,
or vacant.” 52 However, landlords occasionally challenged the enforcement of housing codes as creating disparate impact on minority populations, arguing that maintenance costs landlords
money which is then passed down to tenants leading to an increase in the cost of affordable housing, a class of housing that is
predominately used by minority populations.53
47. ST. PAUL, MINN., MUN. CODE ch. 6, § 34.01(1) (2005), https://library
.municode.com/mn/st._paul/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIILECO_
TITVIBUHO_CH34MIPRMASTALSTPR [hereinafter ST. PAUL MUN. CODE];
see also MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., MUN. CODE ch. 12, § 244.20, https://library
.municode.com/mn/minneapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_
TIT12HO_CH244MACO_ARTIGE_244.20PUPO (containing similar language).
48. Carlton et al., supra note 46, at 807. The City of Dallas was explicit that
its recent changes to the housing code were meant to ensure that renters did
not have to live at the “mercy of slumlords” and “ensure the rights of all residents of our city to live in safe, clean, quality homes in neighborhoods that are
free of blight.” Hallman, supra note 2; Dallas Must Find a Way To Protect Tenants, Preserve Affordable Housing, supra note 4.
49. ST. PAUL MUN. CODE, supra note 47.
50. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2010).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Magner, 619 F.3d at 833; Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (“ This lawsuit arises
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One example of this type of litigation is Gallagher v. Magner. 54 In that case, the landlords argued that “the City violated
the FHA because aggressive enforcement of the Housing Code
had a disparate impact on racial minorities.” 55 The appellants
were landlords who owned properties that had been “cited between ten and twenty-five violations per property for conditions
including rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate
sanitation facilities, inadequate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and screens, and broken or missing
guardrails or handrails.” 56 These citations were a mix of basic
repairs (such as missing guardrails or inoperable smoke detectors) to more substantial violations (such as inadequate heat or
sanitary facilities). They were not for cosmetic repairs, but ones
that endangered the fundamental goal of “protect[ing] the public
health, safety and welfare.” 57
The Eighth Circuit found that the landlords had sufficient
evidence for a prima facie case that the enforcement of housing
codes was creating a disparate impact.58 The landlords supported their allegations with statistics about the affordable
housing shortage in St. Paul, the demographics of people needing affordable housing, and the increase in costs for landlords
that were passed on to tenants or resulted in the sale of properties, as well as statements from the U.S. Department of Housing

out of Defendant City of Minneapolis’ (the “City”) alleged implementation of unlawful housing policies and heightened enforcement of those policies against inner-city landlords in a discriminatory manner.”); McRae v. District of Columbia,
No. 05-2272, 2007 WL 842963, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (“ The plaintiff, the
owner of several multi-family housing buildings, alleges that the District of Columbia engaged in practices that violated both the FHA and the DCHRA. . . .
[Alleging violation by] issu[ing] a list of ‘Hot Properties,’ i.e., properties with
serious housing code violations, and . . . prosecuting the owners of those properties.”); Bolden v. City of Topeka, No. Civ. A. 02-2635-KHV, 2004 WL 303521, at
*3 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2004), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“Count III alleges that the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by increasing residential housing code standards to unreasonable levels; [and] aggressively and selectively enforcing its policy against racial minorities . . . .”); Peoria
Area Landlord Ass’n v. City of Peoria, 168 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2001)
(“Plaintiffs respond that the Ordinances . . . have a disparate impact . . . .”).
54. Magner, 619 F.3d at 828.
55. Id. at 833.
56. Id. at 830.
57. ST. PAUL MUN. CODE, supra note 47, at ch. 6, § 34.01.
58. Magner, 619 F.3d at 837.
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and Urban Development (HUD) detailing a decrease in affordable housing in St. Paul. 59 The Eighth Circuit found that “the existence of a significant statistical disparity, even one resulting
from economic inequality, [was] sufficient to create a prima facie
case . . . .” 60 The landlords conceded that the housing codes were
necessary for maintaining “minimum property maintenance
standards, keeping the City clean and housing habitable, and
making the City’’s neighborhoods safe and livable.” 61 They proposed that the city return to an older program that focused on
maintaining positive relationships with landlords.62
The Eighth Circuit was satisfied with the alternative policy
outlined by the landlords, meaning that St. Paul had to abandon
its challenged housing code policy and return to an older version. 63 In the face of lawsuits like Magner, cities and local governments trying to pursue legitimate government objectives
“can’t even make slumlords kill rats without fear of a lawsuit.” 64
Housing codes represent a difficult balancing act for cities as
they try to protect tenants from substandard housing while also
not contributing to the rising cost of affordable housing.
b. Targeted Housing Codes
Cities and developers often have housing codes that appear
to be aimed only at safety or who lives there. For example, these
ordinances are passed “as a means of preventing overcrowding,
minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on” the school system. 65 But facially neutral laws can still be discriminatory. 66 Cities have a history of
enacting housing codes to maintain minimum safety, but they do
not always effectuate those goals—either because they are challenged by landlords hoping to avoid financial obligations, or because the concerns about safety are influenced by white, middleclass conceptions of housing.
59. Id. at 834–35.
60. Id. at 836 (quoting Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp.
1169, 1180 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1995)).
61. Id. at 837.
62. Id. at 837–38.
63. Id. at 838.
64. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
65. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–500 (1977).
66. See id.; Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (E.D. La. 2009); United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (D. Haw. 1995).
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For example, in United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., a private
housing development limited the number of people who could
live in each apartment type. 67 The court found that the restriction discriminated against the plaintiffs based upon family
status, because the policy was not tied to the square-footage of
the apartment.68 The court cited expert analysis that determined “that Tropic Seas’ occupancy provision regarding studio
and one-bedroom apartments would exclude 92 to 95 percent of
all families with children, but only 19 to 21 percent of all families
without children.” 69 The plaintiffs also had a letter written by
the vice-president of the development company that intimated
that “the concern was not occupancy standards, but rather was
children . . . .” 70 On the surface the rule is about occupancy numbers, but in practice it created a heavy burden on families with
children.
The blood-relative ordinance is an example of a facially neutral city ordinance that was racially discriminatory in practice. 71
St. Bernard Parish, near New Orleans, Louisiana, passed an ordinance that prohibited people from renting single-family homes
to nonblood relatives. 72 It also placed a moratorium on the construction of multi-family dwellings.73 The parish had only passed
the law in order to help rebuild the community in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, 74 but the federal district court held that the
ordinance, despite being facially neutral, was racially targeted.75
The city councilperson who proposed the ordinance stated that
its purpose was to “maintain the demographics of St. Bernard
Parish,” which at the time was primarily white. 76 The public conversation surrounding the ordinance also included references to
“‘ghetto,’ ‘crime,’ ‘blight,’ and ‘shared values’ [which] are similar
to the types of expressions that courts in similar situations have

67. 887 F. Supp. at 1352 (“Apartments ordinarily will be limited to occupancy by the following number of persons: studio and one-bedroom apartments,
two persons; two-bedroom apartments, three persons. This does not apply to
houseguests.”).
68. Id. at 1361–62.
69. Id. at 1360.
70. Id. at 1361.
71. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
72. Id. at 565 n.1.
73. Id. at 566.
74. Id. at 565.
75. Id. at 577.
76. Id. at 569–70.
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found to be nothing more than ‘camouflaged racial expressions.’” 77 Based upon that evidence “the [c]ourt conclude[d] that
the Parish and Council’s intent in enacting and continuing the
moratorium is and was racially discriminatory,” even though the
ordinance never mentioned race. 78
These examples highlight the complicated history of local
housing code objectives and impact. The government, both local
and federal, has made efforts to increase access and quality of
housing, but past discrimination has created patterns and systems that still impact communities today, even through facially
neutral policies.
B. PLEADING STANDARD
Pleading requirements are the entry point to court for plaintiffs. Older pleading standards and requirements created a
highly formalized system that produced detailed pleadings that
were “at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming, and at
most productive of confusion as to the real merits of the cause
and even of actual denial of justice.” 79 Notice pleading developed
as a way to ensure that parties were not prevented from having
their day in court because of a procedural deficiency. 80 Under the
notice pleading system, plaintiffs merely submit a complaint,
which is a means of notifying the court and the opposing party
of the facts and legal issues.81
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were adopted
in response to the failings of the previous system. 82 The pleading
standard created by the FRCP was much more liberal, requiring
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 83 The function of a pleading that
follows Rule 8 of the FRCP is to “give the defendant fair notice
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it

77. Id. at 571 (quoting Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
78. Id. at 577.
79. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1943).
80. See id. at 458 (discussing how lawyers took advantage of the complicated pleading procedures); Elizabeth Roseman, A Phoenix from the Ashes?
Heightened Pleading Requirements in Disparate Impact Cases, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2006) (“ These rigid requirements made a litigant’s day in
court more a game of semantic skill than a decision on the merits of the claim.”).
81. Clark, supra note 79, at 456–57.
82. See Roseman, supra note 80, at 1047.
83. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a)(2).
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rests.” 84 The goal of the more liberal pleading requirements was
to “focus litigation on the merits of a claim” rather than for litigants and courts to get lost in the procedural details. 85
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal refined the requirements under
Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly held that n order to adequately show the
grounds upon which a claim rests, the complaint must have
enough facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” 86 In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint
needs “allegations [that] plausibly suggest[]” 87 that the alleged
conduct has taken place. The Supreme Court emphasized in
these cases that it did not create a “heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” 88
The plausibility standard was further explained in Iqbal,
which outlined a two-step process for analyzing plausibility.
First, the judge examines the allegations to determine which are
facts and which are legal conclusions.89 Second, using only the
factual allegations, the judge determines whether the complaint
is plausible.90 Plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” 91 It invites inclusion of the judge’s point of view
because the “determinations of plausibility depend on baseline
assumptions about the way the world usually works” 92 and such
assumptions can “carry the imprint of judges’ individual backgrounds and biases.” 93 The language of “experience and common
sense” contrasts the objective language in Boumediene v. Bush
that highlighted judicial “expertise and competence” rather than
experience and common sense. 94 The post-Iqbal pleading system
84. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citing Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
85. Id. at 514.
86. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
87. Id. at 557.
88. Id. at 570.
89. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
90. See id. at 679.
91. Id. at 679.
92. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 498 (2010).
93. Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority
Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443,
1451 (2010).
94. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008); Kassem, supra note
93, at 1453.
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now encourages judges to import their own life experiences when
determining whether a plaintiff’s allegations are a plausible explanation of the facts.
The Supreme Court has also considered the interaction been
the pleading standard and the prima facie case. In Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment needed to plead a prima facie
case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.95 The Supreme
Court rejected that pleading requirement for two reasons. First,
the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard and had no place
at the pleading stage. 96 Second, when courts required plaintiffs
to plead a prima facie case, they were creating a heightened
pleading standard that went beyond the goal of notice pleading. 97 The Supreme Court favorably cited it’s decision in
Swierkiewicz in its Twombly decision, indicating that it still envisioned a liberal pleading standard like the one articulated in
Swierkiewicz. 98
Having a liberal pleading standard like notice pleading is a
vital part of the legal system because it shapes which cases have
their day in court. When plaintiffs bring housing discrimination
cases, this pleading stage is the first barrier. If it is raised higher
or invites judges to incorporate their own sense of what is normal, it could lead to more and more discrimination cases being
dismissed if judges just do not believe that discrimination is an
issue that still persists. 99
C. DISPARATE IMPACT
One of the methods for proving discrimination is disparate
impact, which seeks to challenge “practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent” that
still operate to maintain “the status quo of prior discriminatory
. . . practices.”100 The Supreme Court discussed and affirmed disparate impact in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. In that case, a factory
originally had a discriminatory hiring procedure that confined
95. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
96. See id. at 511.
97. See id.
98. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
99. A subjective standard could allow judges to dismiss cases “simply because such cases do not seem to mesh with a particular judge’s experience and
his or her common sense.” Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of
New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 238 (2011).
100. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
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people of color to lower-paying positions.101 Then, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company switched to
using a facially neutral policy—requiring a high school diploma
and the completion of two different general intelligence tests. 102
The Supreme Court held that the requirements were unlawful
because the purpose of the Civil Rights Act—much like the purpose of the FHA—was to “remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white” people over other
groups.103 Plaintiffs could use antidiscrimination legislation to
challenge barriers that were “overt[ly] discrimin[atory] [and]
also practices [or barriers] that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” 104 Plaintiffs could use disparate-impact liability to challenge systematic policies that favored, even indirectly,
certain groups over others.
Disparate-impact liability does not depend upon the intention of the actor. Antidiscrimination statutes were meant to address and remove “mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.” 105 The FHA follows the same
principles as those discussed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Even
before the Supreme Court officially recognized disparate-impact
liability under FHA, other courts acknowledged that “[e]ffect,
and not motivation, is the touchstone” for discrimination under
FHA because “clever men may easily conceal their motivations,
but more importantly, because ‘whatever our law was once, . . .
we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the
public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.’” 106 Even
without intent, laws, and the people who enforce them, can create effects that disadvantage certain groups. Disparate-impact
liability plays an important role in the legal landscape because
it allows plaintiffs to challenge practices that appear to be facially neutral but in reality have a greater impact on a specific
category of people.
These three sections highlighted the major legal issues at
play in the Inclusive Communities decision. The Supreme Court

101. Id. at 427.
102. Id. at 427–28.
103. Id. at 429–30.
104. Id. at 431.
105. Id. at 432.
106. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)
(quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)).
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decided Inclusive Communities against a backdrop of past government-sanctioned and -incentivized housing discrimination.
The decision also implicated the methods that plaintiffs use to
challenge housing practices. Finally, the decision addressed the
on-going struggles associated with the substantive goal of the
FHA to provide fair housing to all. This next part contextualizes
the Inclusive Communities decision within these three issues.
II. ROBUST CAUSALITY ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE
DISCRETION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITH
ACCESS TO COURTS
In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact was a theory of liability under the FHA and introduced a new standard, robust causality, to evaluate claims of
disparate impact. But its holding was flawed in four important
ways: (1) the Court did not provide sufficient guidance for the
lower courts for applying robust causality; (2) it conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent for pleading; (3) it casts a pall on disparate-impact claims before they even reach the merits stage;
and (4) the holding grants the benefit of the doubt to zoning officials and cities who do not warrant such deference from courts.
Section A analyzes the Inclusive Communities decision and
its robust causality standard. Section B demonstrates the lack of
guidance that the new standard provides for lower courts. Section C compares the new robust causality standard to the holding in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema. Finally, Section D explains how
the Supreme Court imprudently granted unnecessary and unwarranted leeway to cities.
A. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES AND THE ROBUST CAUSALITY
STANDARD
The Supreme Court recognized disparate-impact liability
under the FHA in Inclusive Communities. 107 The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a nonprofit organization that advocated
for racial and socioeconomic housing integration in Dallas, challenged the method by which the Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs (the Department) distributed tax credits
for affordable housing developments.108 The Department distributed tax credits to developers and developments through the
107. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513–14 (2015).
108. Id.
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Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. 109 A development that received tax credits through LIHTC could not “refuse housing solely because a person is using a Section 8
voucher.” 110 Because developments that accepted LIHTCs could
not refuse housing based solely on Section 8 vouchers, the distribution of LIHTCs influenced where people with low incomes
could live. 111
The plaintiffs challenged the Department’s method of dispersing affordable housing because, they alleged, it created a disparate impact. 112 In distributing tax credits, the Department
scored applications based upon statutory and nonstatutory factors, such as the location of good schools.113 But, despite the scoring system, the Department retained discretion in the final decision as to which developers and which projects received tax
credits.114 ICP alleged that, in exercising its discretion, the Department “continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits.” 115 ICP argued that the
Department created a disparate impact by “granting too many
credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and
too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.”116
The district court found that ICP had enough statistical evidence to demonstrate that the Department’s distribution of tax
credits created a disparate impact. 117 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that disparate impact could create liability under the FHA, and held further that such claims were evaluated

109. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–15 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014),
aff ’d Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015).
110. Id. at 314. Section 8 is a government program that subsidizes housing
“so eligible families can afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing.” 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.1(a)(1) (2017).
111. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
112. Id.
113. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. §§ 2306.6710(a)–(b) (West 2008); Tex. Op. Att’y.
Gen. No. GA-0208, at 2–6 (2004).
114. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 317, 319.
115. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015).
116. Id.
117. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 (N.D. Tex. 2010). ICP relied on a report prepared for
the Texas House of Representatives that showed “77% of LIHTC units in the
city of Dallas were in above-average minority areas.” Id.
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under a burden-shifting test. 118 The Department then appealed
the issue of disparate impact under the FHA to the Supreme
Court of the United States. 119
The Supreme Court recognized that the FHA allowed for
suits based upon disparate impact.120 It compared the language
in the FHA with that in employment discrimination legislation,
like the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) and
Title VII. 121 Previous interpretations of ADEA and Title VII “instruct[ed] that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims when their text refers to the
consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and
where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose.” 122 All three statutes contain the word otherwise at the end
of a list of prohibited activities. 123 The Court held that “otherwise” signaled “a shift in emphasis from an actor’s intent to the
consequences of his actions,” meaning that, like ADEA and Title
VII, FHA included liability for disparate impact. 124
In recognizing disparate-impact liability, the Court also introduced a new standard, robust causality, to impose some limitations. 125 The Court emphasized that “[d]isparate-impact liability mandates the ‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers,’ not the displacement of valid governmental policies.” 126 The robust causality standard was intended to
prevent disparate-impact liability from transforming the FHA
into “an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their
priorities” because the FHA was designed only to ensure housing
118. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
747 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). The court
adopted the burden-shifting framework promulgated by HUD. Id. The plaintiff
first has to show that the action has or will have a discriminatory effect. 24
C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017). If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then shifts
to defendant to show that “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one
or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent
or defendant.” Id. If the defendant can satisfy its burden, then the plaintiff can
still prevail if it can show that there is an alternative practice that will achieve
similar goals but with less discriminatory effect. Id.
119. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2515 (2015).
120. Id. at 2515–22.
121. Id. at 2519 (“ Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise adversely affect’ language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s otherwise make unavailable’ language.”).
122. Id. at 2518.
123. Id. at 2519.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2522–23.
126. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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authorities achieved their objectives “without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation” and not
to dictate the housing policy of different areas. 127
For the actual mechanics of the standard, robust causality
uses similar requirements as typical disparate-impact cases, but
requires more from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs still need to identify both
the statistics that show disparate impact and the policy or policies alleged to have caused that impact. 128 From its original conception in Griggs, courts have required that plaintiffs alleging
disparate-impact claims have to provide the statistics and identify the policy that created the impact. 129 The Court did not
change the pieces that are part of a disparate-impact case, however the language surrounding the traditional requirements signal that the Court requires more from plaintiffs alleging disparate impact under the FHA.
The additional language compels more from plaintiffs because it places an emphasis on the causal connection and shifts
the causal inquiry to earlier in the litigation process. First, in
terms of causality, the Court made it clear that the limitations
were intended to prevent defendants (which would mostly be cities or other local governments 130) from being “held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” 131 The combination of the
term robust and the Court’s articulated reasoning of protecting
defendants creates an impression that courts should even more
carefully scrutinize whether the policy or policies actually
caused the disparity. Second, in addition to requiring a stronger
showing of causation, robust causality also shifts the focus from
the prima facie stage to the pleading stage. The Court held that
“[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or pro-

127. Id.
128. Id. at 2523.
129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (analyzing the consequences of the defendant’s
practices).
130. See J. William Callison, Inclusive Communities: Geographic Desegregation, Urban Revitalization, and Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act,
46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1039, 1049 (2016) (“Larger institutions, such as governmental entities, banks and insurance companies, are more likely to have placement,
financing, lending and insurance underwriting ‘policies’ that bring disparate
impact analysis into play.”).
131. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. The limitations were
also intended “to protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact
claims.” Id. at 2524. The Court was concerned that allowing abusive disparateimpact claims would undermine the purpose of the FHA. Id.
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duce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.” 132 That
language in the decision instructs lower courts to “examine with
care whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact.” 133 If a plaintiff does not have sufficient factual
allegations at the pleading stage “demonstrating a causal connection” then the complaint “cannot make out a prima facie case
of disparate impact” and should be dismissed.134 Unlike the
pleading standard used by Griggs and its progeny, robust causality gives more deference to the decisions of the defendant, often zoning officials who have to “make decisions based on a mix
of factors.” 135
In Inclusive Communities the Court recognized disparateimpact liability under the FHA, but at the same time announced
a standard for lower courts that specifically concentrated on
shifting through and weighing cases at an early stage. The Court
created a pathway for plaintiffs to allege disparate impact under
the FHA, but balanced the potential for liability with a more demanding standard so that defendants would have more room to
act without legal consequence.
B. ROBUST CAUSALITY IS FLAWED BECAUSE IT LACKS
GUIDANCE FOR LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court endeavored to balance allowing governments to take action without fear of litigation from residents and
landlords with allowing plaintiffs to challenge government action through disparate-impact liability, but its holding in Inclusive Communities is flawed because it failed to provide sufficient
guidance to lower courts in two important areas. First, it created
confusion about which stage of litigation (pleading or prima facie) is subject to robust causality. Second, it created uncertainty
about what would qualify as a policy, a necessary component of
the robust causality standard.
1. At What Stage of Litigation Does Robust Causality Apply?
The language in Inclusive Communities is not clear about
when the robust causality standard should be employed, at summary judgment phase or earlier at the pleading stage, which con132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 2523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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flicts with the nature of the two different stages of litigation. Inclusive Communities and the cases that it cites were decided at
summary judgment phase, 136 or at a more developed stage of litigation where plaintiffs would be required to have a prima facie
case.137 But the language in the Supreme Court decision implicates both motions for summary judgment and pleadings. The
Court stressed the need for “adequate safeguards at the prima
facie stage” and also held that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege
facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case
of disparate impact.” 138 The opinion ties together robust causality, prima facie, and the pleading stage, which is likely to lead to
confusion among lower courts as to when to apply a robust causality requirement. The confusion is probable because not all disparate-impact cases make it to the summary judgment phase;
some cases are decided as the result of motions much earlier in
the litigation process, like motions to dismiss. 139
In fact, lower courts have used robust causality when deciding motions to dismiss, applying a stricter standard earlier in
litigation. In Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, the court applied the
robust causality requirement at the pleading stage. 140 The court
dismissed the case, holding that “a plaintiff must adequately allege—at the pleading stage—facts demonstrating a causal connection between the challenged policy and the alleged disparity.” 141 The court specifically cited the burden-shifting
framework from Inclusive Communities without acknowledging
that in Inclusive Communities the courts were determining the
appropriate standard for summary judgments.142
Applying robust causality standard at the pleading stage, as
the court did in Ellis, is in tension with the informational asym-

136. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district
court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Appellants challenge the summary judgment order . . . .”).
137. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491–92 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
138. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (emphasis added).
139. See Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at
*4 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (illustrating an FHA claim being decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which is analyzed under the motion to dismiss standard).
140. Id. at *5.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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metries early in litigation. For disparate-impact cases, the plaintiffs need evidence about the defendant’s purposes or institutional practices to satisfy prima facie. 143 Parties have the opportunity through discovery to develop the factual record, including
evidence of the defendant’s motivations and practices, between
pleading and summary judgment. 144 Under the current summary judgment process “the plaintiff has a right to substantial
discovery; she is in effect entitled to search the haystack for needles.” 145 But, at the pleading stage, there is still an informational
asymmetry. 146 Some evidence of practice or policy could be gathered before discovery, but often such evidence is in the exclusive
control of the defendant, and only accessible to the plaintiff
through discovery. 147 “The Court’s emphasis on an early causation showing, coupled with its limitations on the use of statistical
discrepancies, renders housing disparate-impact claims particularly difficult.” 148 Requiring plaintiffs to have evidence of the defendant’s inner workings, at the pleading stage, ignores the reality of discovery.
Even without robust causality the pleading stage can be particularly challenging for disparate-impact claimants. For example, in Strauss v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff alleged that the
Chicago Police Department had a practice of hiring individuals
with a history of brutality. 149 To support his allegation, he relied

143. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still
Out for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
719, 726 (2013).
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
145. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90,
108 (2009).
146. “ The plaintiff ’s failure to plead unknowable facts could in some cases
result in dismissal of a claim that should have been successful, and net social
welfare decreases as the defendant unjustly retains wealth that should have
compensated plaintiff for her injury.” Id. at 114.
147. Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 52 HOW. L.J. 31, 58–69 (2008).
148. Callison, supra note 130, at 1050.
149. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 1985).
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upon statistical analysis of complaints against that police department.150 The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, even though it recognized that “plaintiffs will lack the information necessary to meet even the minimum pleading
requirements . . . set out here until they are allowed discovery.” 151 When challenging an institution based upon its internal
practices and policies, discovery is a vital tool, without which discriminatory actions are likely to go unremedied.
The facts from Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. offer an example of how an information asymmetry could
function in the housing context, with outsiders who are only
armed with statistics. 152 In that case, the plaintiffs were two
white tenants who alleged that the apartment owner employed
tactics to exclude people of color from the building. 153 As tenants,
those plaintiffs might have knowledge about patterns in building
operation, but it is more likely that all that they could point to
would be the demographics of the apartment complex. Because
they were tenants and not employees they would not have had
direct access to application procedures. They were outside of the
application process, like Strauss in Strauss v. City of Chicago.
The denied applicants would be even further outside the process.
Tenants might have heard of other people who had been rejected
or have statistics, but without discovery or other access to the
owner, they would not be able to point to a specific policy. Their
lack of insider knowledge is not a reason to deny them access to
discover if they have a plausible complaint.
Some commentators have argued that allowing too many
cases past the pleading stage will lead to abusive litigation or
fishing expeditions.154 Fishing expeditions are speculative
claims that plaintiffs bring to court with the hope of proceeding
to discovery to find other adverse information. 155 Courts and
150. Id. at 768.
151. Id. at 769.
152. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
153. Id. at 208.
154. Strauss, 760 F.2d at 770 (discussing how a creative lawyer could create
ruinous liability for municipalities). It could be argued that the Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis case is an abuse of the system since the plaintiff is challenging
housing codes that require only the barest minimum. No. 14-CV-3045, 2015 WL
5009341, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and
Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 220 (citing
Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and
Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 192).
155. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say “No Fishing”: The Lure of Metaphor,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 17 (2006).
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commentators have often cast fishing expeditions as a drain on
the litigation process because they allow plaintiffs to rely on
vague circumstances and then extract more damaging information from the defendant, sometimes about an entirely different matter. 156 While there is always a potential for abusive or
speculative litigation, Professor Elizabeth Thornburg argues
that the term fishing expedition is coded language used by
judges and lawyers to influence or reinforce attitudes about the
merits of certain types of litigation.157 Largely, the phrase has
been used to cast doubt on the merits of cases alleging discrimination—cases where judges are often already skeptical of the
merits.158 Courts’ reliance on the fishing expedition metaphor
also undercuts the American legal system’s belief that discovery
“eliminate[s] surprise, lead[s] to enlightened settlements, and
when necessary, facilitate[s] more focused and efficient trials.” 159 The fishing expedition narrative also conflicts with the
reality of how discovery is used. 160 Most cases have little to no
discovery.161 There will certainly be cases where plaintiffs file
complaints as a harassment tactic or as a fishing strategy, but
these appear to be limited examples.
Despite the potential for abuse, disparate impact is too vital
a tool to severely limit it. The Supreme Court has previously
acknowledged the potential for abusive litigation and rejected
that argument as a rationale for making the pleading standard
stricter. 162 In the face of that argument, the Court championed
a liberal pleading standard.163 In a modern setting discrimination is not always blatant, or even intentional.164 Often an organization will rely on a traditional practice without realizing

156. Id. at 11–27.
157. Id. at 43.
158. Id. at 48–49.
159. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301 (2002).
160. Empirical research has shown that “the typical case has relatively little
discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation.” Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527
(1998).
161. Subrin, supra note 159, at 308.
162. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002).
163. Id.; see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1293, 1301–02 (2010).
164. Laya Sleiman, A Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts and A Defense of the
Disparate Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 72 FORDHAM L.
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that it furthers or creates a “built in headwind[] for minority
groups.” 165 It is not easy to identify or challenge discrimination
when it is motivated by unconscious bias or influenced by stereotypes in decision-makers. 166 But these unconsciously motivated
actions still produce discriminatory effects that have a real impact on people in minority groups. 167 Even in Inclusive Communities the Court recognized the role that disparate impact plays
in “counteract[ing] unconscious prejudices and disguised animus
that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.” 168 Congress can create laws to attempt to protect minority groups or
remove more barriers, but courts actually ensure that the rights
of individuals and minority groups are protected. 169 Courts cannot fulfill that role if plaintiffs cannot bring cases.
The robust causality requirement is also not likely to be limited to disparate-impact cases under the FHA. Observers have
argued that the robust causality requirement will be limited to
race-based claims under the FHA. 170 However, those same observers have acknowledged that the holding could extend to
other protected classes. 171 And courts have cited the robust cau-

REV. 2677, 2681 (2004) (recognizing that there are social, historical and economic factors that can influence actions).
165. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
166. Catherine S. Manegold, “Glass Ceiling” is Pervasive, Secretary of Labor
Contends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at B9 (“[S]ubtle but pervasive patterns of
discrimination dominate the public, private and nonprofit sectors of society because of a ‘myopia’ on the part of many white male managers who ‘unthinkingly
discriminate’ without having any idea they are doing so.”); Hart, supra note 12,
at 742–43; Malveaux, supra note 143, at 725–26.
167. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (holding that even though the company
did not intend to create a discriminatory hiring policy, requiring a high school
diploma still created a disparate impact on groups that have historically not
had as much access to education).
168. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
169. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (noting that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 really became a “major instrument of social progress because of the
Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power.”).
170. Callison, supra note 130, at 1048–49.
171. Id. at 1049.
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sality requirement in cases about racial discrimination in employment,172 age discrimination in employment, 173 sex discrimination in employment 174 and racial discrimination in voting
rights. 175 As other courts begin using the robust causality standard in other disparate impact arenas (such as Title VII or
ADEA), even more plaintiffs will be at risk of having their lawsuit dismissed too soon, before relevant evidence is even available. Robust causality has the potential to impact many plaintiffs,
stopping complaints in their tracks at the pleading stage because
the Court was not clear about when the standard should be applied.
2. What Counts as a Policy Under Robust Causality?

In its holding from Inclusive Communities, the Supreme
Court was also unclear about what a policy is. In Inclusive Communities, it emphasized that “a disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot
point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.” 176 The Court only briefly discussed policy and noted “a onetime decision may not be a policy at all.” 177 The Court stated that
disparate impact is meant to remove policies that create “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” 178 However, in an era
of subconscious or unintentional discrimination 179 the ambiguity
around policy could prevent plaintiffs from challenging important categories of decisions.
The definition of policy is especially important in banking
and mortgage lending. In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo, the

172. Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 191 (D. Mass. 2015) (requiring a showing of robust causality, in a race-based employment discrimination case, so that the disparate impact was not the “result of mere chance”).
173. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 77 (3d Cir. 2017)
(requiring a showing of “robust causality” in a case concerning age discrimination in employment).
174. Anfeldt v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 15 C 10401, 2016 WL 1056670,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2016).
175. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 264 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that statistical evidence is not for a claim to survive unless the plaintiff can point to a
specific policy).
176. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2522, 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
179. Hart, supra note 12, at 745–49.

996

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:969

plaintiffs challenged the lending practices of Wells Fargo, arguing that the bank gave predatory loans to minority applicants. 180
Los Angeles alleged that Wells Fargo engaged in redlining and
reverse redlining, lending practices that concentrates minority
groups into specific, usually less desirable, areas of a city. 181 The
court was not convinced that Los Angeles had identified an actual policy that led to these alleged outcomes.182 Los Angeles argued that the lack of adequate safeguards and monitoring had
produced a disparate impact, intimating that they were challenging Wells Fargo’s policy and practice of giving discretion to
loan officers. 183 The court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment because Los Angeles had failed to identify a specific policy leading to discrimination, thus failing to meet the robust causality requirement. 184 City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo
& Co., demonstrates that courts are utilizing the robust causality standard at the pleading stage to dismiss cases because of the
ambiguity of policy.
It could certainly be argued that a lawsuit is an ineffective
means of addressing what could be characterized as a lack of a
policy or an amorphous policy that gives employees more discretion. For an employer, it could be more difficult to change a structure of discretion as opposed to an explicit company policy to, for
example, deny loans to people of color. But modern forms of discrimination are more likely to come from people in positions of
power who “‘unthinkingly discriminate’ without having any idea
they are doing so.” 185 Banks are no longer literally “drawing a
red line around certain areas in which credit would be denied.” 186
Instead, people make decisions that are influenced by stereotypes and judgments that “subtly distort the ostensibly objective

180. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx),
2015 WL 4398858, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015), aff ’d, 691 F. App’x 453 (9th
Cir. 2017).
181. Wells Fargo, 2015 WL 4398858, at *1. See generally United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 (D. Mass. 1998) (defining
redlining and reverse redlining); S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 21 (1994) (defining
redlining and reverse redlining); Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (defining redlining).
182. Wells Fargo, 2015 WL 4398858, at *8 (“[T]he City fails to actually identify any policy that created an artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary barrier.”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at *14.
185. Manegold, supra note 166 (quoting Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich).
186. United Co. Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 203 n.5.

2017] ROBUST CAUSALITY AND DISPARATE IMPACT 997
data set upon which a decision is ultimately based.” 187 Even in
the absence of a specific, affirmative policy, stereotypes can play
a role in individual decisions or moments when discretion is allowed. 188 Housing officials and developers may no longer be be
actively discriminating, but they still have the potential to be
influenced by stereotypes and subconscious biases. A narrow definition of policy would not capture the types of behavior that create modern housing discrimination.
In addition to being vague about what constitutes a policy,
the Court’s holding also calls into question whether one-time decisions would qualify as a policy. The Court only briefly discussed policies, but it did state “a one-time decision may not be
a policy at all.” 189 The section of the opinion was not controlling
on the decision, but it does create an uphill battle for plaintiffs
who are trying to challenge one-time decisions because the Court
raises doubts about whether such one-time decisions are appropriate or even eligible for disparate-impact liability. It is not entirely clear why the Court chose to question one-time decisions
given that they can have drastic impacts on communities. 190 St.
Paul’s decision to route Interstate 94 (I-94) directly through a
thriving black community is one stark example. 191 That solitary
decision razed an entire community that is still feeling the impacts. 192 Urban redevelopment plans can have a similar impact.
For example, in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.

187. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1211 (1995); see also Hart, supra note 12, at 746.
188. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 502 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (granting summary judgment
for plaintiffs based in part on the fact that the agency retains discretion when
making the final decision about where to allocate tax credits); Hart, supra note
12, at 767–69.
189. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
190. See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of
Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing a redevelopment plan
passed by the City that would destroy a specific community); Laura Yuen, Central Corridor: In the Shadow of Rondo, MPR (Apr. 29, 2010), https://www
.mprnews.org/story/2010/04/20/centcorridor3-rondo (discussing the decision to
route I-94 through the predominantly black community between St. Paul and
Minneapolis).
191. Yuen, supra note 190.
192. St. Paul Branch of NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 764 F. Supp. 2d
1092, 1104 (D. Minn. 2011).
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Township of Mount Holly, the plaintiffs challenged the township’s redevelopment plan as discriminatory. 193 The redevelopment plan could be classified as a one-time decision because it
was triggered by an assessment that the area needed to be redeveloped. 194 Unlike the on-going tax credit decisions made by the
Department in Inclusive Communities, the Township of Mount
Holly made a single decision that the neighborhood in question
needed to be reconstructed. 195 The Township did make subsequent decisions, 196 so it might be possible for the plaintiffs to cast
the action as a policy rather than a one-time decision. However,
the Township could make a strong argument that it only made a
one-time decision when it initially determined that it would redevelop the area. That decision had sweeping effects on the community, but there is a strong probability that it could be disqualified based on the robust causality standard. A similar one-timedecision argument could be made in the context of the decision
to route I-94 through a predominantly black neighborhood in St.
Paul. 197 The cities only made a one-time decision, but that one
decision destroyed the homes of 650 black families and the surrounding businesses.198
One might object here that the Supreme Court did not categorically exclude one-time decisions from creating grounds for
disparate-impact liability. Instead, the Court indicated that onetime decisions “may not be a policy at all.” 199 Such a statement
may have been the Court abdicating a role in determining what
a policy actually is due to the complexity of the organizations and
decision-making structures typically involved. In that case, robust causality might not lead to the dismissal of cases with facts
like the I-94 expansion and the Mount Holly redevelopment. Additionally, the I-94 and Mount Holly examples involved affirmative decisions made by city officials, meaning that they lend
themselves more to being a “policy” than a discretionary system
193. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 377.
194. Id. at 378–79.
195. Compare Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) (describing how TDHCA continually
makes decisions), with Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at
379 (describing how the Township made a one-time determination that the area
needed redevelopment).
196. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 379 (“A series of
redevelopment plans followed [the initial designation].”).
197. Yuen, supra note 190.
198. Id.
199. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (emphasis added).
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like the one in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. However,
the potential for even these extreme examples to be argued either way demonstrates that by adding one sentence into its opinion the Court has injected a new degree of uncertainty into housing discrimination cases, an uncertainty that will invite further
arguments in lower courts.
By raising questions about whether one-time decisions, the
Court created ambiguity as to whether plaintiffs can challenge
single government decisions, even those decisions that have significant and disproportionate impact. The Court’s lack of clarity
on what qualifies as a policy and its doubt about one-time decisions severally limits plaintiffs’ access to court and allows discriminatory decisions to go unchallenged.
C. ROBUST CAUSALITY CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT ON PLEADINGS
Inclusive Communities is flawed because it conflicts with established Supreme Court precedent regarding the interaction
between the pleading standard and the prima facie case. The
Court explored the interaction between pleading and prima facie
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema. 200 In Swierkiewicz, a fifty-three-yearold Hungarian man alleged that he was discriminated against
because of his age.201 To support his complaint, he pointed to evidence that the person hired to replace him was twenty years
younger than him and that his supervisor “stated that he wanted
to ‘energize’” the department. 202 The Second Circuit dismissed
the complaint because he failed to plead a prima facie case.203
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the heightened
pleading standard imposed by the court of appeals. 204 The Court
was adamant that “discrimination plaintiff[s] need not plead a
prima facie case of discrimination.” 205 The first the Court relied
on was that “[t]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”206 The Court further held, having the heightened requirement undercut the liberal pleading
standard central to the U.S. court system.207 Plaintiffs do not
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
Id. at 508–10.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511–12.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.
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need to plead with “greater ‘particularity,’ because this would
‘too narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings.’” 208 The Court
explained that pleadings are supposed to give defendants notice
of the action pending against them and focus the litigation on
the merits, so it would be detrimental to the litigation process to
create a heightened pleading standard.209 It also acknowledged
that it was illogical to import the prima facie case to the pleading
stage because “[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts
and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation
of the required prima facie case in a particular case.” 210 The holding from Swierkcwicz demonstrates that the Court envisioned
the pleading stage as a mechanism of giving notice, and subsequent stages of litigation as eliminating meritless claims. 211
Despite the ruling in Swierkiewicz, the district court in Ellis
v. City of Minneapolis still required the plaintiffs to plead a
prima facie case. 212 The court dismissed the first complaint because the plaintiffs “failed to adequately plead a prima facie case
of disparate impact.” 213 Citing Inclusive Communities, the district court stated that the plaintiffs needed to plead “facts that
plausibly demonstrate[d] a causal link between the challenged
policy and th[e] disparity.” 214 The complaint was amended and
refiled.215 When considering the second amended complaint, the
court decided a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which
uses the same standard of review as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.216 The plaintiffs cited Swierkiewicz to stand for the
proposition that disparate-impact complaints do not have to
plead a prima facie case.217 But the district court disagreed with
the plaintiffs’ use of Swierkiewicz, holding instead that the holding from Inclusive Communities meant that plaintiff’s need to

208. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283
n.11 (1976)).
209. Id. at 512–14.
210. Id. at 512.
211. Id.
212. No. 14-CV-3045, 2015 WL 5009341, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1
(D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016), aff ’d, 860 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2017).
216. Id. at *4 (citing Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th
Cir. 2012)).
217. Id. at *5.

2017] ROBUST CAUSALITY AND DISPARATE IMPACT 1001
“adequately plead a prima facie case of disparate impact” in order to survive a motion to dismiss, which is in direct opposition
to Swierkiewicz.218
Some scholars have argued that Swierkiewicz can exist
alongside other articulations of the pleading standard as a “safe
harbor” for discrimination complaints. 219 For example, Joseph
Seiner contends that since Swierkiewicz stands for the proposition that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination do not
need to plead a prima facie case, if they do plead a prima facie
case then they “should inherently survive a motion to dismiss.” 220 In other words, Swierkiewicz created the floor, ensuring
that anything above that floor could survive a motion to dismiss. 221 That argument, however, requires an actual difference
between the floor and the prima facie case. In Ellis, the court
raised that floor to the level of a prima facie case, erasing the
safe harbor and requiring the plaintiff to plead the elements of a
prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss. 222 Applying the
robust causality standard at the pleading stage, as happened in
Ellis, is the same heightened pleading standard that the Court
specifically denounced in Swierkiewicz. By creating a link between the prima facie requirement and pleadings, the Court
seemed to be at odds with the fundamental underpinnings of its
reasoning.
Additionally, Seiner and others have argued that the
Swierkiewicz holding is limited to the pleading standard for intentional employment discrimination.223 But the holding and
reasoning from Swierkiewicz is not just limited to disparate
treatment employment discrimination cases for several reasons. 224 First, the Court focused on the fact that the court of appeals had “required [the] petitioner to plead a prima facie case”
218. Id. at *3; cf. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016)
(‘“[E]lements of the prima facie case are [not] irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination suit . . . . [T]he elements of a prima facie case may
be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.’”) (quoting
Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013)).
219. Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 222–23
(2010).
220. Id. at 223.
221. Id.
222. Ellis, 2016 WL 1222227, at *7–8.
223. Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1619–20 (2011); Seiner, supra note 219, at 193–
94.
224. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002).
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to survive a motion to dismiss. 225 It instructed lower courts that
an evidentiary standard should not control at the pleading
stage. 226 That reasoning should apply to other discrimination
pleadings, including disparate impact. Additionally, the Court
was emphatic in its defense of the liberal pleading standard. 227
The goal of pleading, under the FRCP, is to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” 228 The Court’s defense of the pleading standard
is not specifically related to pleading in the context of employment discrimination or disparate treatment. Finally, the Second, 229 Sixth, 230 Seventh, 231 and Ninth 232 Circuits have all expressly extended the holding from Swierkiewicz to cases
involving housing discrimination. The Court’s holding in
Swierkiewicz demonstrates its commitment to allowing plaintiffs to have their day in court, but the robust causality standard,
with its focus on swift dismissal of complaints, contradicts that
holding, heightening the requirement for plaintiffs to gain access
to court.
D. ROBUST CAUSALITY INAPPROPRIATELY GIVES DEFERENCE TO
CITIES.
Finally, the decision in Inclusive Communities is flawed because it carves out a zone of protection for zoning officials and
other housing officials. In Inclusive Communities, the Court conceded that zoning laws played a central role in creating a system
225. Id. at 510.
226. See Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Swierkiewicz in a housing discrimination case for the proposition that the prima
facie case relates only to the plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden).
227. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (“[I]mposing the Court of Appeals’ heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).”).
228. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
229. Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs., 124 F. App’x 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–12 (2002)) (holding that, in a
claim alleging a violation of the Fair Housing Act, “[t]he pleading need not state
the elements of a prima facie case.”).
230. Lindsay, 498 F.3d at 439 (holding that Swierkiewicz applies for pleadings in housing discrimination cases).
231. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Swierkiewicz when describing what is necessary to put in a complaint that alleges a violation of the FHA).
232. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that in a housing discrimination case, “failure to plead [a prima facie
case] does not support dismissal at the outset”).
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of racial segregation in housing. 233 But it also emphasized that
the FHA is “not an instrument to force housing authorities to
reorder their priorities.” 234 Zoning officials have to make choices
based “on a mix of factors, both objective (such as cost and traffic
patterns) and, at least to some extent, subjective.” 235 The Court’s
position rests between acknowledging the importance of disparate impact as a check on government decision-making and striving to give government actors “latitude to consider market factors.” 236
The Court drew a distinction between zoning laws, which
have a long history of being discriminatory on their face and in
practice, and government development decisions, which the
Court sees as beneficial to the communities. 237 But there are parallels between city redevelopment programs and zoning laws because cities use both to influence land use and social order. 238
Development decisions by zoning officials, even if facially neutral, often have profound impacts on communities.239 In the past,
cities enacted zoning laws that would effectively force minorities
out of certain areas or keep them hemmed in to others.240 Some
233. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015); see also Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 16–18 (1988) (per curiam) (invalidating zoning law preventing construction of multifamily rental units); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182–88 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting construction of new multifamily dwellings); Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569, 577–78 (E.D.
La. 2009) (invalidating post–Hurricane Katrina ordinance restricting the rental
of housing units to only “blood relative[s]” in an area of the city that was 88.3%
white and 7.6% black).
234. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
235. Id. at 2523.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 2522–23.
238. Justin Graham, Comment, Playing “Fair ” with Urban Redevelopment:
A Defense of Gentrification Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Test,
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1719, 1735–38 (2013) (discussing the efforts that cities are
making to entice wealthy residents to return to city centers).
239. Carla Dorsey, Note, It Takes a Village: Why Community Organizing Is
More Effective than Litigation Alone at Ending Discriminatory Housing Code
Enforcement, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 437, 441–52 (2005) (analyzing
two different instances in which cities used revitalization programs and goals
to effectively remove low-income communities from their neighborhoods).
240. See Gardner, supra note 33, at 327–30; Nelson, supra note 22, at 1695–
96 (discussing the racially motivated Chinese Laundry Law); Richards, supra
note 23, at 763–67 (discussing how facially neutral laws about building size
were used to control who could afford to live in certain areas of a city); see also
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cities and states still use facially neutral building codes to accomplish substantive goals.241 But now, redevelopment efforts
often push lower income populations out to make room for
wealthier groups in the way that zoning codes used to. 242 For
example, in the Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Township of Mount Holly case mentioned above, a redevelopment plan essentially ousted African American residents from a
section of the town.243 In that case the city decided to redevelop
an area, predominantly inhabited by African Americans, which
had begun to deteriorate. 244 The city created a revitalization
plan, which included demolishing some older buildings and constructing new housing units. 245 The new housing units were
priced well above what the former residents could afford, effectively expelling the former residents, much like economic zoning
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 55–56 (1993) (discussing how city
councils used their power over federal housing funds to build new projects in
existing minority neighborhoods).
241. In July 2013, Texas enacted a law that required clinics providing abortions to comply with many of the same building codes imposed on ambulatory
surgical centers. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/
supreme-court-texas-abortion.html; David Nather, Supreme Court Strikes
Down Texas Abortion Clinic Regulations, SCI. AM. (June 27, 2016), https://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/supreme-court-strikes-down-texas-abortion
-clinic-regulations. Commentators argued that the law was actually designed to
limit access to abortion clinics. Nischay Bhan, Contested Spaces: Texas’s HB2
and the Weaponization of Building Code, YALE PAPRIKA, http://www
.yalepaprika.com/contested-spaces-texass-hb2-and-the-weaponization-of
-building-code (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). In fact, about half of the state’s forty
one clinics had to close down after the passage of the law. Molly Hennessy-Fiske,
Here’s What Happened when Texas Cracked Down on Abortion Clinics, L.A.
TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-abortion
-figures-20160630-snap-story.html.
242. Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1194–
99 (2016) (defining gentrification as “a systematic remake of the class composition of urban areas due to the displacement of low-income residents and businesses”).
243. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount
Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 378 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing the neighborhood’s demographics and the effects of the city’s redevelopment plan).
244. Id. (“ The neighborhood was not perfect. For one, it was crowded. This
created a parking shortage, which led residents to pave their backyards for use
as driveways, which, in turn, led to drainage problems. In addition, the fact that
the homes were owned in fee simple meant there was no one with a vested interest in maintaining common spaces, such as the alleys. Some of the owners
were nothing more than absentee landlords, renting to individuals with little
interest in maintaining the properties.”).
245. Id. at 379.
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laws did in the past. 246 The Township used a redevelopment plan
to accomplish much the same impact as zoning laws, and the
Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case that the redevelopment plan
had a disparate impact on African Americans.247 The court emphasized the fact that disparate-impact claims are about
whether a community has been “disproportionately affected” or
is “disproportionately burdened” by the actions of the defendant. 248 The results from Mount Holly show that, in fact, redevelopment plans can also drive out communities, particularly communities of color or low-income communities, and have a
disparate impact in much the same way that historic zoning laws
did. It is shortsighted of the Supreme Court to attempt to draw
a distinction between zoning laws and redevelopment plans, because the impact is very similar.
Granted, housing codes, redevelopment plans, and zoning
laws do play an important role in ensuring the safety of tenants.
Housing codes have been in place since the late 1800s and arose
primarily in response to public health and safety concerns. 249
Most municipalities have some form of housing code. 250 Lawsuits
that challenged basic safety housing codes, like Gallagher v.
Magner, might have motivated the Supreme Court to protect defendants and by extension ensure that housing codes remained
in place. The opinion in Inclusive Communities references Magner, noting, “Magner was decided without the cautionary standards announced in this opinion.” 251 The circumstances surrounding Magner paint a bleak picture of the living conditions of the
tenants. 252 Housing codes play an important role in ensuring
safe housing options.
246. The new homes cost around $200,000, while the city had purchased the
homes from residents at prices around $45,000. Id. at 380. The residents also
had to endure years of having their neighborhood disrupted by construction,
including substantial damage due to the interconnected nature of the homes.
Id.
247. Id. at 382.
248. Id. at 383.
249. H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 29, 31 (1996); Dorsey, supra note
239, at 440.
250. Ross, supra note 249, at 31.
251. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015).
252. The properties “received code enforcement orders that, in many cases,
cited between ten and twenty-five violations per property for conditions including rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities,
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Notwithstanding the fact that most housing codes are designed to provide “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family,” 253 the enforcement of those
codes can still be used as a weapon to change or remove a community. 254 For example, the municipalities of Stockton, California, and Addison, Illinois, both aggressively enforced housing
codes as a means of regaining downtown property for the city. 255
The properties in question were primarily owned or rented by
minority groups. 256
In Inclusive Communities, the Court attempted to strike a
balance between these two sides of housing codes, but conveyed
instead the sense that such codes should not be second-guessed.
The Court held that enforcement of housing codes is a “valid governmental polic[y]” 257 that should be protected, but also recognized that those codes can “arbitrarily creat[e] discriminatory effects or perpetuat[e] segregation.” 258 That section of the Court’s
analysis struck a balance between the importance of safety and
also recognizing that housing codes can be wielded in a discriminatory fashion, as in Stockton and Addison. Much of the rest of
the analysis, however, instead communicates the importance of
protecting government policies and priorities from second-guessing. The Court specifically noted that it was not the goal of the
FHA to place cities and developers in a “double bind” if they decide to act or not.259 The Court also acknowledged that zoning
officials “must often make decisions based on a mix of factors”
and that the FHA does not “decree a particular vision of urban
development.” 260 Finally, the Court criticized the motivations
underlying the plaintiffs’ complaint, noting that it might “simply

inadequate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and
screens, and broken or missing guardrails or handrails.” Gallagher v. Magner,
619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010).
253. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949).
254. Dorsey, supra note 239, at 441–51 (describing two instances in which
cities used housing codes to remove low-income home owners from their houses).
255. Id.; see also Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1260 (E.D.
Cal. 2005) (describing enforcement policies); Hispanics United of DuPage Cty.
v. Village of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1140–43 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same).
256. Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1139; Dorsey, supra note 239, at 442–
43.
257. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522, 2524 (2015).
258. Id. at 2522.
259. Id. at 2523.
260. Id.
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[be] an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable approaches a housing authority should follow.” 261 Weaving these
comments into the rest of the analysis indicates that the Court
was attempting to shield decision-makers from liability. While
cities often act with the motivation of improving quality and
safety of housing, that does not preclude their actions from having a disproportionate effect on minority communities.262 As the
Third Circuit reminded lower courts in Mount Holly, “Disparate
impact claims . . . do not require proof of discriminatory intent.” 263 A city’s motivations are not relevant; if the action has
“disproportionately burdened a particular racial group” or other
group, then there is a disparate impact.264 The Court may have
wanted to protect government discretion, but that discretion can
and has had a disproportionate burden on specific, often minority communities. Cities and zoning officials do not always warrant the benefit of the doubt.
One might note here that without robust causality, there
could be even more efforts to litigate every decision made by zoning officials, leaving cities unwilling to act to “even make slumlords kill rats [because of the] fear of a lawsuit.” 265 The dissent
in Inclusive Communities stressed this potential consequence,
focusing particularly on the deteriorating houses in Magner. 266
While unquestionably landlords do and have used litigation to
avoid their responsibilities under city codes, that does not mean
that legal avenues should be curtailed for all, especially because
there are also instances where enforcement of housing codes by
cities has been motivated by discriminatory intent or had discriminatory impact. 267 In fact, Stockton purposely increased its

261. Id. at 2522.
262. See, e.g., Li, supra note 242, at 1196–1203 (discussing the impact that
some city “redevelopment” plans have on minority communities).
263. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011).
264. Id.
265. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (“[The Eighth Circuit] concluded that the city’s ‘aggressive enforcement of the Housing Code’ was actionable because making landlords respond to
‘rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, inadequate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors,’ and the
like increased the price of rent.”).
267. See, e.g., Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264 (E.D. Cal.
2005) (discussing how the city adopted a strategy of aggressive enforcement of
housing codes in order to regain the property for the city).
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enforcement of housing codes as part of a conscious effort to regain control of that property in that section of the city. 268 In St.
Paul, aggressive enforcement of the housing codes led to forced
sales, which meant that low-income tenants were evicted from
their housing. 269 Even if the city is not trying to evict tenants or
regain control of the property, sometimes enforcement of housing codes can have deeply negative impacts on communities.
Challenging these laws through litigation might not always be
the answer because it could discourage cities from enforcing laws
that increase the safety and habitability of residences. However,
increasing the barriers to plaintiffs at the pleading stage could
also prevent plaintiffs like those in Price v. City of Stockton from
being able to dispute city action. Litigation may be a blunt tool,
but it is a necessary one.
The Inclusive Communities decision recognized disparateimpact liability, but in a limited manner. The new robust causality standard requires plaintiffs to point to a specific, ongoing policy causing disparate impact and encourages lower courts to dismiss the cases early in the litigation process. Moreover, the new
requirement does not provide sufficient guidance to lower courts,
and the guidance that it does provide conflicts with the reality of
disparate impact and the Court’s own precedent. The significant
drawbacks to this standard should encourage the Court to abandon the robust causality standard and rely on traditional pleading standards.
III. THE ROBUST CAUSALITY STANDARD IS AN
UNNECESSARY BARRIER TO CLAIMS OF HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION.
Given the significant problems with robust causality, the
Court should abandon that standard and continue to rely on the
traditional pleading standard and disparate-impact analysis.
Requiring causation so early in a disparate-impact case is unnecessary given the protections for defendants that already exist. The Court should also return to traditional disparate-impact
analysis because it is better adapted to modern discrimination.
Section A demonstrates that defendants already have sufficient protection at the pleading stage. Section B contends that
the robust causality standard cannot remain because it does not
reflect the reality of discriminatory practices. Ultimately, this
268. Id.
269. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 835 (8th Cir. 2010).
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Note concludes that the Court should abandon robust causality
because both the traditional pleading standard and disparateimpact analysis already provide legal protections for defendants.
A. ROBUST CAUSALITY SHOULD BE ABANDONED BECAUSE
CURRENT PLEADING STANDARDS RENDER IT UNNECESSARY AND
REDUNDANT.
The Court should abandon robust causality because the current pleading standard already sufficiently protects defendants.
The Court may have been concerned about a proliferation of disparate-impact cases if it did not place some limits at the pleading
stage. However, the current legal standard for motions to dismiss already protects defendants. 270 The current jurisprudence
for evaluating a pleading originates with the Twombly and Iqbal
cases. 271 Those two cases instruct courts to engage in a two-step
analysis of a pleading.272 The court first sifts through the allegations to determine which are factual and which are legal conclusions.273 Then, using only the facts, the court determines
whether a claim is plausible. 274 The plausibility inquiry instructs courts to employ “judicial experience and common sense”
in order to determine what is plausible.275 Observers have described how that instruction from the Supreme Court serves two
functions: it elevates the legal barriers at the pleading stage 276
and injects a higher degree of subjectivity into the analysis. 277
So, rather than the pleading serving as notice of impending litigation, 278 pleadings must now bear the heightened duty of passing a plausibility test. 279 Plausibility already provides more protection for defendants than the prior standard, which was that a
“complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
270. See generally Brescia, supra note 99 (discussing the impact of the plausibility standard on discrimination claims).
271. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
272. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (2009).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response
to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1723 (2013).
277. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 9–11 (2009).
278. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
279. See Clark, supra note 79, at 457–58 (discussing the historical disadvantages of requiring particularity in pleading).
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set of facts in support of his claim.” 280 The Supreme Court has
already changed the fundamental role of the pleading stage in
such a way that makes it more challenging for complaints to survive motions to dismiss.
The current system already provides sufficient protection
for defendants without robust causality. Robust causality has
similar philosophical underpinnings to plausibility. The Court
created the plausibility standard to protect telecommunication
companies from lawsuits alleging collusion when the plaintiffs
only had evidence of parallel behavior, 281 meaning that the
Court did not want defendants to be responsible for market collusion unless they actually created an anticompetitive atmosphere. Similarly, in Inclusive Communities, the Court held that
the robust causality standard was necessary to “protect[] defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” 282 Both of these standards exist, then, to ensure that when
defendants are hauled into court they are there to actually answer for a charge that is tied to their behavior. In light of the fact
that robust causality seeks to accomplish the same objective as
the plausibility standard, robust causality should be abandoned
as an unnecessary and redundant standard.
At this point, some might argue that if there is already judicial scrutiny of the pleading then robust causality will not harm
plaintiffs because it does not diverge from what is currently expected. While it is true that the goal of robust causality echoes
that in Twombly and Iqbal, it is also important to acknowledge
that even if the standards are similar, robust causality does require something different. Twombly and Iqbal instruct courts to
determine if a complaint is plausible, while robust causality
blends the requirements for the prima facie stage with the pleading stage, holding that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at
the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating
a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.” 283 Both plausibility and robust causality may involve the court giving more scrutiny to a complaint than it might
280. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
281. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 570–71 (2010) (describing the allegations of parallel conduct in Twombly).
282. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
283. Id.
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have faced prior to Twombly and Iqbal or Inclusive Communities, but they are not identical requirements. Maintaining robust
causality would normalize a trend of requiring more and more at
early, undeveloped stages of the litigation process, which is antithetical to the notice pleading philosophy. The Court should
abandon robust causality because the plausibility standard
alone accomplishes the goals that motivated robust causality.
In addition to already having jurisprudence that protects defendants, empirical studies of case outcomes show that the plausibility standard has, in practice, protected defendants. Kendall
Hannon conducted an analysis of the rate of dismissal for civil
rights cases before and after the holdings from Twombly and Iqbal. 284 He found that the number of cases dismissed after those
cases increased by eleven points and the number of denied motions to dismiss decreased by seven points.285 Other studies have
also found a slight but statistically significant increase in the
number of motions to dismiss judges granted in civil rights
cases. 286 The empirical evidence suggests that the plausibility
standard has actually played the role that it was intended to play
and decreased the likelihood of a complaint surviving a motion
to dismiss. The real-world result of the plausibility standard further underscores how unnecessary and redundant the robust
causality standard is.
Robust causality is also unnecessary because it is a generally applicable standard that was prompted to control an issue
that was already under control in the lower courts. Part of the
opinion in Inclusive Communities was concerned about cases like
Magner, where landlords attempted to use the FHA to evade
their responsibilities under city housing codes. 287 The Inclusive
Communities Court noted that the Magner case, which found
that the landlords were able to establish a prima facie case of
284. Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the
Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1811 (2008).
285. Id. at 1837.
286. Benjamin Sunshine & Víctor Abel Pereyra, Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates After Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 357, 363–71 (summarizing studies); Brescia, supra note 99, at 260–
68 (concluding that courts are more likely to dismiss housing discrimination
complaints after Twombly and Iqbal); Hatamyar, supra note 281, at 607).
287. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015) (stating that FHA suits must not be used to prevent
government entities from enforcing housing codes); Gallagher v. Magner,
619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (describing code violations).
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disparate impact, 288 was “decided without the cautionary standards announced in this opinion,” 289 implying that robust causality would have prevented those plaintiffs from successfully surviving a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
The Court appears to have been concerned that more of these
cases might appear to lead to “perverse outcomes” where the
FHA is used to “maintain the status quo of substandard housing.” 290 In spite of that potential, empirical research by Stacy
Seicshnaydre indicates that lower courts had been doing a sufficient job of controlling for perverse outcomes without robust causality. 291 Seicshnaydre analyzed the appellate record for both
housing-barrier and housing-improvement disparate-impact
claims. 292 Housing-improvement claims, like Magner, were only
half as successful in litigation as more traditional housing-barrier claims. 293 Based upon her research, lower courts were skeptical of housing improvement claims even before robust causality, and they were efficiently disposing or dismissing those cases.
Robust causality is unnecessary because it was a solution in
search of a problem.
Robust causality is a redundant and unnecessary standard.
The plausibility standard seeks to accomplish the same goal that
the Court articulated when announcing robust causality. Plausibility has been successful in practice in decreasing the number
of discrimination claims that survive early stages of litigation.
As such, even without a robust causality standard, there are sufficient protections for defendants to ensure that frivolous lawsuits are handled appropriately. The Court needs to abandon robust causality because it merely reiterates the goals of the
current standard.
B. ROBUST CAUSALITY FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ROLE OF
UNCONSCIOUS BIAS AND HISTORY STILL INFLUENCES DECISIONS.
The Supreme Court should abandon robust causality because the traditional disparate impact framework is better
adapted to combat modern discrimination and further the FHA’s
288. Magner, 619 F.3d at 834–35.
289. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015).
290. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 392, 407 (2013).
291. Id. at 399–402, 413.
292. Id. at 399–403.
293. Id. at 400–01.
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goal of “fair housing throughout the United States.” 294 Throughout much of the United States’ history, people in positions of
power sought to prevent minority groups from living in certain
areas. 295 Now, bankers do not draw red lines around neighborhoods and landowners do not include racial covenants in
deeds,296 but “discrimination is still pervasive, now more often
in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias.” 297 Unconscious
bias 298 and historical systems of discrimination 299 continue unchecked in systems that rely on discretion.300
The impact of discretionary systems can be seen in both
home mortgage lending and access to housing. For example, New
York University did an investigation of home mortgage lending
and found that there were stark differences in the rates given to

294. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
295. Richards, supra note 23, at 763–67.
296. Sometimes these racial covenants remain in deeds but are not enforced.
Randy Furst, Massive Project Works to Uncover Racist Restrictions in Minneapolis Housing Deeds, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/
massive-project-underway-to-uncover-racist-restrictions-in-minneapolis
-housing-deeds/441821703.
297. Hart, supra note 12, at 741.
298. It might not even really be possible to entirely eradicate unconscious
bias. John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (concluding that
evidence of controllability of unconscious bias is “weaker and more problematic
than we would like to believe”); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and
Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121 (1994); Hart, supra note 12, at 746–
48, 767–69. However, that does not mean that housing officials, banks, and
landlords should not be held liable because the problem is deeply entrenched
and difficult to address.
299. For example, in Dallas, the city at the center of Inclusive Communities,
there is a long history of racial segregation that has resulted in neighborhoods
that are, to this day, separated predominantly along racial lines rather than
solely by income. John D. Harden, Maps Show Visible Racial Divides in Major
Texas Cities, Hous. Chron. (July 24, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Highways-interstates-reinforce-divides-in-Texas
-6399606.php; Timmy Huynh & Lauren Kent, In Greater Dallas Area, Segregation by Income and Race, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 29, 2015), http://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/29/in-greater-dallas-area-segregation-by
-income-and-race; Neena Satija, Dallas Struggles to Escape Segregated Legacy,
TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/02/dallas
-struggles-overcome-segregated-housing-legac. This pattern is likely influenced
by the choice to continue to place low-income housing exclusively in the city
center as the government was doing in Inclusive Communities.
300. Hart, supra note 12, at 746–47, 767–69.
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people of color and those given to white people. 301 Loan officers
often have discretion when making loan decisions, 302 much like
the discretion granted to the Department in distributing tax
credits in Inclusive Communities. 303 A similar uneven distribution of resources also occurs in rental markets. For example, researchers at Oregon State University found discrimination in
rental markets that operate under a system of discretion. 304
They sent out 1100 identical emails inquiring about housing but
with different names attached (Patrick McDougall, Tyrell Jackson or Said Al-Rahman) to indirectly indicate the race of the
sender.305 The emails received a different percentage of positive
responses. “The fictional McDougall received positive or encouraging replies from 89 percent of the landlords, while Al-Rahman
was encouraged by 66 percent of the landlords. Only 56 percent,
however, responded positively to Jackson.” 306 In circumstances
where people are either attempting to obtain lending for housing
or access to housing, discretionary systems can lead to situations
where there is disparate impact.
The Supreme Court has previously held that discretionary
decisions can be challenged using disparate impact. 307 In Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, Watson, a black woman, was passed
over for a promotion four times, and each time a white person

301. Manny Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgage by Race, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/nyregion/
15subprime.html.
302. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $21
Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortgage (May 31, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice
-department-reaches-21-million-settlement-resolve-allegations-lending
-discrimination (discussing how the loan officers at SunTrust Mortgage had
“pricing discretion”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-resolve
-allegations-lending-discrimination (discussing how the loan officers at Countrywide had “pricing discretion”).
303. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (mentioning that TDHCA had discretion when distributing tax credits).
304. New Published Study: Name is Enough When it Comes to Discrimination, OR. ST. U. (May 23, 2006), http://www.oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/
2006/may/new-published-study-name-enough-when-it-comes-discrimination.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
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(both men and women) were chosen instead. 308 The hiring decisions were made based upon a discretionary “subjective selection
method[]” 309 much like the subjective methods used to grant
loans or select tenants. The Court concluded “that subjective or
discretionary employment practices may be analyzed under the
disparate impact approach.” 310 The Court recognized that if it
held otherwise, discrimination law could “largely be nullified”
because it would be easy for defendants to circumvent antidiscrimination laws by merely having a discretionary system. 311
The Court needs to abandon robust causality and use its disparate impact precedent because under robust causality it is not
clear whether these discretionary decisions would be considered
appropriate targets of lawsuits. For example, one court has already rejected a challenge to a bank’s loan program using robust
causality. In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo, a lower court
dismissed the case for failure to cite a specific policy when alleging that there had been discriminatory loans. 312 The lack of clarity about what qualifies as a policy and the antiquated conception of discrimination is already making it difficult for plaintiffs
because it is not clear what is necessary to satisfy their burden
so they can challenge these discriminatory patterns.
Some might argue that allowing discretionary practices to
be challenged will open the floodgates to litigation, but there are
several mechanisms that act as checks. First, the courts can emphasize the actual impact of the discretionary practice. For example, the district court in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo
determined that the difference between the loans given to white
and nonwhite applicants was negligible:
[A]n Hispanic Wells Fargo borrower with average non-race characteristics had a 0.0033% likelihood of receiving a High-Cost Loan, a similarly situated African-American Wells Fargo borrower had a 0.0067%
likelihood of receiving a High-Cost Loan, while a similarly situated
non-Hispanic white borrower face[d] only a 0.0008% likelihood of receiving a High-Cost Loan. 313

In that case, Wells Fargo’s discretionary framework had essentially the same impact on white and nonwhite applicants. In
comparison, the recipients of the predatory loans granted by
308. Id. at 982.
309. Id. at 989.
310. Id. at 991.
311. Id. at 989.
312. No. 2:13-CV-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015 WL 4398858, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July
17, 2015), aff ’d, No. 15-56157, 2017 WL 2304375 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017) (per
curiam).
313. Id. at *7.

1016

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:969

SunTrust, a bank that reached a settlement with the Department of Justice,314 were nearly sixty percent black. 315 As the
Third Circuit reminded the district court that had previously
heard the Mount Holly case, disparate-impact claims are about
“ask[ing] whether minorities are disproportionately affected.” 316
In the context of disparate impact, whether the practice is discretionary or standardized is less important than its impact.
The other way to limit challenges to discretionary practices
is to examine whether there is a unifying actor authorizing or
operating in the system. In Watson, for example, the plaintiff
was working at a bank that “had not developed precise and formal criteria for evaluating candidates . . . [but] relied instead on
the subjective judgment of supervisors.” 317 While different supervisors were responsible for each of the hiring decisions, they
were all operating and deciding under the same discretionary
system. The Court suggested such a requirement in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 318 In Dukes, the central issue was about
whether the plaintiffs had enough in common to satisfy class action requirements, but the Court did analyze when it was appropriate to challenge a discretionary decision-making structure. 319
The Court found that a discretionary practice would be appropriate for disparate-impact liability if the plaintiffs identified a
“common mode of exercising discretion.” 320 In the end, the Court
did not certify the class in Dukes because there was no such common mode across every Wal-mart store nation-wide. 321 The decision in Dukes illustrates that there are some limits on challenging discretionary systems, whether that means looking for a
common supervisor or company culture. There are current protections in place for defendants; abandoning robust causality
would not leave defendants vulnerable to a flood of litigation.
CONCLUSION
With the decision in Inclusive Communities, the Supreme
Court was trying to address a problem of defendants—cities in
314. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 31, 2012), supra note 302.
315. Complaint at 2, United States v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 12-cv-00397REP (E.D. Va. May 31, 2012).
316. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011).
317. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988).
318. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355–57 (2011).
319. Id. at 349, 355–57.
320. Id. at 356.
321. Id. at 359–60.
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particular—being held liable for disparate impact regardless of
which action they chose. The Court attempted to strike a balance
between two competing interests. On the one hand, the Court
recognized disparate-impact liability under the FHA, which is
important because actors do not typically announce their intentions to discriminate. On the other hand, the Court wanted to
allow cities the flexibility to respond to complex housing and urban development factors by giving them some protection from
lawsuits. So, it recognized disparate impact but required plaintiffs to satisfy a robust causality standard.
While the Court was trying to strike the right balance, robust causality should ultimately be abandoned because it contributes nothing to the protection of defendants and conflicts
with other precedent and the reality of the impact of housing decision. Robust causality is fundamentally flawed because it: (1)
lacks sufficient guidance for lower courts, (2) conflicts with precedent concerning the role of the pleading and summary judgment stages of litigation; and (3) it seeks to protect actors who
have a long history of creating and perpetuating systems of discrimination in housing. Ultimately, robust causality can be
abandoned because the standard currently in place at the pleading stage and embedded in disparate-impact analysis sufficiently protects defendants from frivolous litigation. Housing
discrimination is a deeply embedded reality in the United
States—one that has impact on many other facets of life. Plaintiffs deserve to be able to challenge those decisions in the courts
that were created to protect individual rights.

